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Introduction
This paper examines the growth and development of Brazil s most dynamic 
high-tech industry defense Section I discusses the matrix of motivations for 
the establishment of the Brazilian defense industry (BDI) Section II reviews the 
growth and strategic directions of the industry Section III elaborates on the 
industry s export drive, especially its major markets and products Section IV 
discusses the catalytic role of the Brazilian government in the defense industry 
Section V analyzes the defense industry s tripod strategy Section VI discusses 
major barriers to the industry s further growth and development
Section I Matrix of Motivations
A perceived external threat to national security is the driving force behind 
establishing an industrial military complex in most countries 1 However, Brazil 
developed a strong defense industry without external impetus Furthermore, 
Brazil has not increased its domestic military expenditures m fact it has 
experienced a real decline in total military expenditures since the early 1970s At 
constant 1982 prices, real military expenditures decreased from US $2,456 million 
m 1973 to US $1,698 million m 1983 2 As mentioned by Stepan, This makes 
Brazil the democracy with the lowest level of military expenditures as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in the world, and the nation with the 
second-lowest level of all major nations m the world 3
How is it possible, then, for Brazil to have one of the most dynamic 
defense industries among the newly industrialized countries (NICs)7 The 
answer to this question may be found by examining the political and economic 
factors that have interacted to determine the BDI s technologically deepening 
growth, development, and overall strategy
Political Factors
Three political factors induced Brazil to create a viable indigenous defense 
industry First, there was a drive to become self-sufficient and free from reliance 
on military imports from industrialized countries During 1946-1970, Brazil 
imported much of its military hardware from the US 4 This dependency 
gradually fueled a growing sense of uneasiness in the Brazilian Armed Forces 
and among geopolitical strategists
Second, it was believed that the development of a strong defense industry 
would enhance Brazil s influence among less developed countries (LDCs) 
throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and potentially produce political 
and economic benefits Strategically, the defense industry could provide Brazil 
with foreign policy instruments to fulfill its long-term aspirations for the
2international arena Arms exports would give Brazil political and economic 
clout over its customers and prevent other countries from exercising a similar 
role 5
Third, a sound defense industry would function as a highly visible 
manifestation of a competent military ruling elite Indeed, the development of a 
defense industry created an opening, or raison d etre for the Armed Forces to 
assume an active role in Brazil s domestic and foreign political and economic 
spheres Interestingly, Stepan argued that the presence of a strong arms industry 
would lessen, not increase, the role of the military m Brazilian politics The 
presence of a massive arms-producing and exporting capacity means that some of 
the ideological and industrial infrastructure arguments the military could 
conceivably utilize as a reason for seizing control of the government are 
lessened 6
Economic Factors
On the economic side a number of factors also favored the establishment 
of an indigenous industry First, a strategy of import substitution was selectively 
re-implemented in the mid-1970s,7 which helped dissolve bottlenecks in those 
sectors that were essential to the upgrading of the Brazilian defense industry 
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) continued into the 1980s, with the BDI 
requiring from suppliers components with high technological content (This ISI 
has also given rise to the development of the Brazilian computer industry8 and 
has provided initiatives in microelectronics and laser technology ) Such a 
strategy necessitates strong forward and backward linkages m the domestic 
economy The BDI has developed strong backward linkages in core sectors such 
as steel, metallurgy, transport equipment, machinery, and electrical and 
electronic industries
Second, the export promotion strategy implemented m the late 1960s and 
early 1970s was in need of new products 9 In the late 1970s Brazil relied on 
defense hardware exports to increase foreign exchange earnings and to further 
diversify its export structure The export of defense hardware also had a 
multiplier effect on the country s overall exports, m that it encouraged 
additional exports of related and non-related goods and services
Third, an increasing emphasis on the development of indigenous 
technologies by the Brazilian government m the 1970s also favored the erection 
of an indigenous defense industry Further, by requiring a high technological 
base, the industry affected the economy s overall capital intensity, the rates of 
technical change and diffusion, and skill intensity A relevant variant of these 
developments was the strengthening of Brazils manpower base 10
3It is possible to argue that Brazilian policy makers believed a strategy of 
dual-use technology would not force a trade-off between butter and guns, as 
mentioned by Edward Kolodziej for France s defense industry The traditional 
choice between guns and butter was transformed into an opportunity to acquire 
both in larger quantities at reduced prices A choice was not necessary since more 
guns sent abroad meant more butter at home 11 But Brazilian policy makers 
rationalized the defense industry by noting its synergistic impact merging 
national security ideals, geopolitical goals, economic growth, and technological 
innovation
Section II Growth and Strategy
Established after the ISI strategy m the mid-1950s, the defense industry benefitted 
from Brazil s highly diversified industrial structure by utilizing off-the-shelf 
components from existing industries such as transport equipment and 
machinery The existence of a mature and developed industrial base supported 
the adoption of a dual-use technology strategy for the first phase of the arms 
industry by dramatically reducing the costs of indigenous defense technology 
development Within a relatively short period, Brazilian defense hardware 
exports were becoming increasingly competitive The BDI also benefitted from a 
skilled labor force Since the late 1940s, many engineers and scientists had been 
trained m military schools to rapidly develop indigenous technology for the 
defense industry 12
Prior to the late 1950s and early 1960s, Brazil s status as a world producer of 
defense hardware was negligible Military agreements with the US provided 
Brazil with most of its military hardware and limited the country to refurbishing 
WWII tanks and to producing only powder, cartridges, and light weaponry13
Between 1964-67, the government established an industrial mobilization 
plan (GIPM) to expand local production of defense hardware and to create 
incentives for State and private sector cooperation in the defense industry The 
GIPM was reinforced by US reluctance to transfer defense technology to Brazil, 
owing to US involvement m Vietnam at the time 14
From 1967-75, a significant move toward local production of defense 
hardware took place Brazilian companies eagerly looked for new partners, and 
European firms responded enthusiastically Consequently, numerous licensing 
agreements and joint ventures were undertaken, leading to large numbers of 
new Brazilian entrants into the defense industry This rapidly and profoundly 
diversified the BDI15 In 1969, the State established Embraer, an aircraft 
manufacturer, which later would become the darling of the industry Likewise, 
already established firms such as Engesa and Avibras were taking first steps 
toward manufacturing defense hardware 16
4In 1974, the Army Minister suggested to Brazilian President General 
Ernesto Geisel that the defense production policy be revised He suggested 
establishing a state-owned enterprise (SOE) that would be subordinated to the 
Army Ministry and would be capable of creating, promoting, and rationalizing a 
modern defense complex Early on the State had protected firms from 
competition by establishing specific niches, which helped them to avoid 
overlapping functions 17 The State started to intervene more consistently in the 
industry after the creation of the Industria de Material Bélico do Exercito 
(IMBEL) IMBEL, created by Law No 6227 of July 1975 and subordinated to the 
Army Ministry, performs a number of key functions in the industry, it 
collaborates in the planning and manufacture of defense materials, it promotes 
technology transfer, and it provides technical and financial incentives for the 
establishment of new firms IMBEL, thus, may be characterized as a composite of 
producer, arms exporter, R&D promoter, and planning agency 18
Given its wide scope of functions and influence over the development of 
the defense industry, IMBEL is closely integrated with other areas of the 
government For instance, its administrative council membership includes the 
President, Ministers of the Armed Forces, Industry and Commerce, and Planning 
and Finance, and the president and directors of IMBEL The president of IMBEL 
is appointed by the president of Brazil19
The catalytic role of the Armed Forces m the BDI is emphasized in the 
Brazilian Third National Development Plan (III PND)
•To support and stimulate the adoption of advanced technologies which 
are in the interest of Brazil and to promote the adaptation of civil 
technology to military purposes by developing projects, materials and 
processes
•To provide incentives for the production and development of military 
technology
•To acquire from the private sector the needed material to equip the 
Armed Forces
These initiatives are justified by national security reasons and by the need to 
reduce external procurement of defense hardware
Since IMBEL s creation the BDI has grown rapidly The suspension of 
several military agreements with the United States m 1977 served to hasten 
indigenous technology build-up and dramatically increased the number of firms 
in the industry 20 In 1987 the industry included more than 600 firms employing 
approximately 150,000 people 21 Table 1 shows a sample of these firms and their 
respective products The abundance and sophistication of the firms indicate the 
depth and capability of the BDI In the second half of the 1980s, as a result of 
indigenous efforts, the self-sufficiency of the Brazilian Army was estimated to be 
around 80 percent Brazil was the only Latin American country m the 1980s
5capable of sustaining military conflict without the need to import defense 
hardware 22
Table 1 Brazilian Defense Industry Major Finns and Products
Firms Products
ABC electronic components and systems
Aeromoto avionics
Amadeu Rossi SA Metalúrgica e Municoes shotguns rifles ammunition
AME motorbikes for police and armed forces
Arsenal da Mannha do Rio de Janeiro (AMRJ) shipbuilder and offshore
Avibras Aerospacial sounding rockets artillery saturation rocket
Bernardini tanks modernization of military equipment
Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC) military ammunition
Companhia Comercio e Navegacao Estaleiro Maua shipbuilders
Companhia de Explosivos Valparaiba hand grenades fuses etc
Datanav Engeharia radar systems
DF Vasconcellos SA optronics
Embraer Empresa Brasileña de Aeronautica SA aircraft
Ede avionics
Engesa Engenheiros Especializados armored vehicles electronic systems guns 
ammunition explosives suspension
Engetromca avionics
ENARM sub-machine guns etc
Equitel radar systems
Encsoon radar systems
Ferranti do Brasil naval systems
Ford do Brasil SA military vehicles
FI Industria e Comercio Ltda naval ammunition
Helibras Helicópteros do Brasil SA helicopters
Hydroar Industria Metalúrgica SA recoilless guns etc
IMBEL Industria de Material Bélico do Brasil light weapons ammunition
Industnas Reunidas Caneco SA shipbuilder
Ishibras Isshikawajima do Brasil shipbuilder
MacLaren shipbuilder
Microlab avionics
Moto Pecas SA modernization of military equipment
MWM Motores Diesel motors
Novatracao Artefactors de Borracha SA rubber pads for tank tracks etc
Orbita missiles aérospatial systems
Pirelli avionics
Prologo electronics
Química Tupan SA military/civil pyrotechnics ammunition
Saturnia SA electronic products and batteries
Siteltra SA multichannel equipment radios etc
SFB Informatica electronic systems
Taurus SA firearms
Tecnasa radar systems
Veroime Estaleiros Reumdos SA shipbuilder
Source Military Technology 10/85 pp 92 119 INFOSTRAT 1 1986 Seguranca & Defesa 
Janeiro/Fevereiro 1985 No 3 Jane s Defense Weekly 16 August 1986 p 256 and INFO 
April 1987 pp 28 33
6Internationalization of Activities
BDI development was fueled in part by the expansion of Brazilian defense firms 
into Europe, Africa, and Asia By transferring its technology to developed and 
developing countries, Brazil s defense industry was replicating the pattern set by 
Western multi-national corporations (MNCs) This is a logical and expected step 
for an industry that has achieved international status and technological 
sophistication In addition, the BDI has been able, by moving overseas, to further 
exploit its firm specific advantages (FSA) and better serve its customers 
Moreover, this strategy allows access to newer and more sophisticated technology 
via branches in developed countries (DCs)23
Brazilian defense firms actively engage m licensing agreements, joint 
ventures, and foreign direct investment in both LDCs and DCs A good example 
is provided by the SOE, Embraer, which established a subsidiary m the U S in 
April 1981, and another in France in 1983 These subsidiaries promote foreign 
sales and provide after-sales service 24 Embraer has recently engaged in joint 
ventures and licensing agreements In 1985 the Royal Air Force selected the 
EMB-312 Tucano turboprop for its new basic trainer aircraft Embraer will 
develop the aircraft jointly with Short Brothers and will manufacture it in 
Belfast, Ireland Both companies plan to research a new generation of commuter 
planes, executive turboprop, and missiles for spaces explorations 25 In Egypt, 
Embraer will export structural components for assembly by the Arab 
Organization for Industrialization under a joint-venture agreement
In a recent development Brazil and Argentina, through an agreement 
between Embraer and Argentina s Fabrica Militar de Aviones (FAMA), began 
negotiations to develop a two-engine passenger plane, the CBA-123 Co­
production of the aircraft and aerospace research are important items m the 
countries current economic integration processes Argentina s share of the joint 
venture is 33 percent, while Brazil owns the remaining 67 percent26 In 1986 
Brazil began sourcing Argentine parts for its EMB-120 Brasilia Deliveries of the 
CBA-123 are scheduled for 1991 27 Argentina is thought to be an important future 
partner for the BDI28
Avibras, the largest exporter of defense hardware, created a joint venture 
(Inscom) in 1989 with China's Great Wall Industry Corporation Inscom will 
manufacture satellites, launch vehicles, earth stations, and antennas 29
International production is not restricted to the aerospace industry 
Engesa is negotiating a US $5 billion package with Saudi Arabia to co-produce 
1,500 EE-TI Osorio mam battle tanks (MBT) 30 Engesa also signed an agreement 
allowing the US-based Ford Motor Company (FMC) Corporation to manufacture
7the EE-9 Cascavel armored car and the EE-11 Urutu armored personnel carrier in 
the US 31
Nor is the internationalization of activities restricted to the four sisters 
(Embraer, A vibras, Engesa, and Bernardini) Taurus, the leading exporter of 
firearms, exports to more than 60 countries and has followed the industry s 
leaders by setting up a subsidiary in the US The American subsidiary assembles 
completely knocked down (CKD) kits imported from the Brazilian parent 
company According to Taurus officials, the US subsidiary is fundamental for 
the company s upgrading of its own products 32
Section III Arms Trade
As indicated above, the BDI has a very aggressive export marketing strategy The 
industry, on average, exports 80-95 percent of its total output In ten years Brazil 
has become the fifth largest exporter of defense hardware worldwide The 
domestic content of Brazilian-made hardware varies considerably The domestic 
content of Embraer products is in the range of 50 to 60 percent This has to do 
with the firm s marketing strategy of sourcing a number of parts and 
components from foreign companies, thereby facilitating maintenance of their 
planes abroad 33 The domestic content of Avibras products, on the other hand, 
is m the range of 80 percent34 Engesa s products vary considerably, basic products 
such as the Urutu and Cascavel have a much larger domestic content than the 
EE-T1 Osorio MBT, which uses a number of imported parts such as the turret35 
The following sections will elaborate on the country s export marketing strategy, 
its major products and markets
The Decision-Making Process
The Brazilian government controls arms exports through a council that 
deliberates on the National Export Policy of Defense Material (PONAENEM)
This policy is defined and coordinated by a select group of government officials 
the President the General Secretariat of National Security Council (SGCSN) and 
Ministers of each branch of the Armed Forces, Foreign Relations (Itamaraty), 
Finance and Planning All exports must be approved by this council For 
instance, the PONAENEM has established that no arms be exported to South 
Africa, Israel, or countries in Central America 36
Export Marketing Strategy
A  major characteristic of the BDI has been its strong export orientation 
The industry exports 80-95 percent of its domestic production Though Brazil 
exports virtually all categories of hardware and a wide array of arms in the four
8main weapons classifications, it does not compete m the top end of high- 
technology hardware Brazilian exports of military hardware range from 
subsonic combat airplanes to firearms 37
The industry s international marketing strategy is a niche strategy 
designed (a) to avoid direct competition with superpower producers, (b) to 
provide tropicalized technology, (c) to customize products, (d) to offer on-site 
technical assistance, (e) to provide export credits, (f) to have flexibility m 
compensatory agreements, and (g) to have no strings attached This strategy has 
substantially increased Brazil s share of the international arms m arket38
However, this export policy occasionally conflicts with Brazil s foreign 
policy For instance, the no strings attached element, which means that no 
end-user certificates are required, resulted in arms being sold to Libya for resale to 
Iran in the war against Iraq The president of Engesa, Luiz Whitaker Ribeiro, has 
defended his position I sell to one country which resells to another— that s a 
sovereign act that can t be controlled [this accusation is] a device invented by 
the big powers to limit sales by smaller countries 39 As noted by Ohlson and 
Skons, Western countries regularly violate this principle, besides, the Brazilian 
arms export marketing strategy is considered quite flexible Arms deals today 
are concluded with complex financing arrangements, technology transfer and 
offset agreements involved 40
Trade credits, barter, and subcontracting have been used to sell Tucanos to 
Egypt, warships to Paraguay, handguns to Canada, and armored vehicles to 
Gabon Arms are frequently traded for oil from Iraq Recently, Brazil bought 
German submarines through a US $200 million barter agreement involving 
Brazilian iron ore 41
In addition to the know-why, the know-what to sell is a vital factor m 
any marketing strategy Brazilian producers have achieved a high degree of 
flexibility in hardware design, accommodating their customers needs as much as 
possible 42 In addition, Brazilian producers offer on-site technical support and 
training Design flexibility is frequently cited by purchasers of Brazilian hardware 
as an important feature and is a competitive advantage for Brazil Another 
important aspect of export sales is a non-price advantage In several of Brazil s 
major markets, cultural affinities and a mutual NIC status figure prominently in 
arms deals 43
Major Markets and Products
As shown in Table 2, exports of arms by NICs are highly concentrated m 
Brazil and Israel Together they produced almost half the exports in 1982-86 
Brazil leads NIC producers with the highest export growth rates of military 
hardware Brazilian hardware exports grew swiftly after improved designs were
9successfully tested in combat in the Middle East during the 1970s Brazil 
augmented its export of hardware in 1975, after the creation of IMBEL Exports of 
arms are highly concentrated m four firms Avibras, Embraer, Engesa, and 
Bernardini In 1984 Avibras share was 40 percent of the total Brazilian arms 
sales Engesa, 30 percent Embraer, 20 percent, Bernardini, 5 percent, and other, 5 
percent44 Brazilian exports of arms have increased dramatically In 1975 total 
arm exports reached US $46 million, and by 1986 totalled US $3 billion
Table 2. The Top 10 Third World Suppliers of Major Weapons, 1982 86
Supplier
Share in total TVJ 
exports of major 
weapons 
1982 86
Number of 
recipients 
TW 1C Region
Major recipient 
Share Country Share
Israel 23 9 15 2 F East 38 8 Taiwan 38 1
Brazil 23 3 24 4 M East 48 3 Iraq 36 7
Egypt 14 1 9 0 M East 89 2 Iraq 89 2
Jordan 73 2 1 M East 91 4 Iraq 88 1
Libya 73 8 0 M East 80 8 Syria 47 4
S Korea 72 6 0 F East 43 4 Malasia 316
N Korea 5 5 5 0 M East 95 8 Iran 95 8
Syria 3 3 2 1 M East 98 9 Iran 88 5
Singapore 21 6 0 F East 50 9 Taiwan 40 7
Indonesia 1 6 3 0 M East 643 Saudi
Arabia
643
Percentage shares are based on SIPRI trend indicator values as expressed m US $millions 
at constant 1985 pnces
TW=Third World IC=Industnalized countries F East=Far East M East=Middle East 
Source Adapted from Ohlson T and E Skons (1987) p 198
The accuracy of these figures, however, is compromised by the high level 
of secrecy surrounding arms sales and by counter trade deals Table 3 illustrates 
the inconsistencies between published amounts of Brazilian arms exports For 
instance, in 1984 the figures range from US $750 million to US $3 billion and 
may be inflated In addition, CACEX (Foreign Trade Agency of the Banco do 
Brasil) trade statistics include records not for exports of heavy defense hardware 
as per CACEX s Chapter 93 of NBM (Classification of Brazilian Manufactures, 
index for classification of all goods), but rather for exports of firearms and 
ammunition CACEX s statistics do not publicly acknowledge exports of defense 
hardware 45
While an exact figure on the volume of trade is extremely hard to obtain, 
the data do reveal a very dynamic industry that is rapidly shedding its mfant- 
mdustry status Table 4 provides further information on the exports of arms by 
the ten largest exporters The figures show an upward trend in the period 1982- 
85, the peak of the Iran-Iraq conflict
10
Table 3 Brazilian Exports of Arms (estimated values m US $ billions)+
News Media Sources 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
1 Defense Journal of Latin America 100 • • • 3 00 300
Jun/Jul 1981 Aug/Sep 1981
2 Jornal do Brasil Sept 4 1984 100 100 100 100 100 • •
3 Jornal do Brasil June 2 1984 • • • • 0 80 • •
4 Jornal do Brasil March 18 1984 • • • • 0 75 1 00 1 00
5 Jornal do Brasil June 29 1984 • • • • 100 • •
6 Veja June 6 1984 • • • • 2 00 • •
7 0  Globo July 1 1984 • • • • 100 1 50 1 50
8 Brazilian Foreign Ministry m • • • • 140 • •
O Globo Nov 19 1984
9 US Department of State in • • • 2 60 2 60 • •
O Globo Nov 19 1984
10 CEBRES • • • 180 2 30 3 00 3 00
+ nominal dollars
Source Seguranca & Defesa 3 January/February 1985 p 30
Table 4 Brazilian Exports of Arms and Ammunitions (US $ millions)
Firms 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Engesa 54 00 18 90 128 20 179 40 194 10 159 80 53 90
Avibras 6 40 3 40 3 80 6 60 19 50 197 20 167 20
Embraer • 310 0 90 17 80 4 70 0 50 0 30
FN do Brasil 1 80 4 80 8 60 310 1 80 150 190
Taurus • 180 5 60 2 70 160 3 00 510
CBC 2 30 2 30 200 190 3 40 2 70 2 60
CBV • • • 7 30 9 50
IMBEL 6 60 120 2 20 170 2 00
Britanite 0 40 • • 4 10 • • •
Mercedes Benz • 2 10 1 10 010 • • •
Others 150 140 010 1 20 2 10 4 40 1 70
Source Associacao Brastletra das Industrias de Materials de Defesa (ABIMDE) 1988
Some sources indicate that, in terms of volume, Brazil became the fifth 
largest exporter of arms m 1986, with sales to over 40 countries 46 In dollar terms, 
however, Brazils exports in comparison with total US arms sales were only 10 
percent
Brazil s 1986 exports were concentrated m two regions North Africa and 
the Middle East The concentration of arms exports in these regions is mainly 
due to the Iran-Iraq war and to Brazil s chronic commercial deficit with oil- 
exporting nations Brazil, therefore, has adopted an aggressive export marketing 
strategy towards these countries Table 5 illustrates the major destinations for 
Brazilian arms
Table 5 Brazilian Arms Exports-Major Markets and Clients
Latin America Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador DNF Guiana 
Honduras Panama Paraguay Peru Sunname Uruguay Venezuela
Africa Angola Algeria Egypt Gabon Libya Morocco Mozambique Nigeria Togo 
Tunisia Zimbabwe
Middle East Saudi Arabia Cyprus United Arab Emirates Iran Iraq Kuwait Qatar 
East and South Asia India China Thailand
Europe France Portugal United Kingdom____________________________________________
Source INFOSTRAT 1 ACE 1986
In Latin America, Chile and Colombia are the major importers of 
Brazilian hardware As shown in Table 6, Chile has imported approximately 500 
armored wheeled vehicles from Engesa Argentina m the second half of the 
1980s is also rapidly becoming a major commercial and technological partner
Brazilian hardware sales to Africa are largely destined for North Africa, 
where Algeria, Egypt, and Libya are the major importers Other trade partners 
include Nigeria, Mozambique, and especially Angola In 1986 Algeria was 
negotiating an arms package worth US $400 million, which included the EE-11 
Urutu EE-9 Cascavel, and technology transfer In 1988 Libya was considering the 
purchase of an arms package worth US $2 billion, which included the EE-T1 
Osorio MBTs and Leo and Piranha missiles 47 Iraq became Brazil s best customer 
m the Middle East by acquiring thousands of Engesa s major export products, 
such as the EE-3, the EE-9, and the EE-11 Urutus Additionally, Iraq makes large 
purchases from Avibras and from Embraer Saudi Arabia, the Far East, Europe 
and China are becoming important clients for Brazilian hardware The 1985 sale 
of 130 T-27 Tucanos to the Royal Air Force m Great Britain was the first sale of 
Brazilian-made military airplanes to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO member The transaction is likely to prompt first-time purchases by other 
NATO members, even the US is considering the purchase of 500 T-27 Tucanos 48
12
Table 6 Brazilian Major Arms Exporters—Engesa Embraer Avibras
Company
Engesa
Quantity
Country Exported Product Year
Latin America
Argentina 10 EE 9 Cascavel 1982
Bolivia EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
Colombia 100 EE 9 Cascavel 1981
100 EE 11 Urutu 1981
Chile 200 EE 9 Cascavel
300 EE 11 Urutu
Guiana EE 11 Urutu 1982
Paraguay EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
Suriname products unknown 1983
Uruguay EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu 
Jararaca
Venezuela EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
Africa
Angola 2000 trucks 1986
200 jeeps 1986
Algeria EE 9 Cascavel 1981
Osorio 1985
Gabon EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
Libya 1000 EE 9 Cascavel 1981/84
1000 EE 11 Urutu 1981/84
Osorio 1984
Mozambique trucks and jeeps
Morocco 60 EE 11 Urutu
Nigeria 100 EE 9 Cascavel
Togo EE 9 Cascavel
Tunisia EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
Zimbabwe EE 9 Cascavel
Middle East 
Saudi Arabia EE 9 Cascavel 1981 85
EE 11 Urutu 1981 85
Osorio 1981 85
Cyprus EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu 
Jararaca
Umted Arab Emirates EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
Iran EE 9 Cascavel
Iraq 1300 EE-9 Cascavel 1979 86
1000 EE 11 Urutu 1979 84
500 Jararaca 1982 84
300 Osorio 1986
400 Ogum 1986
Kuwait EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
Qatar EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
East and South Asia
China EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
India EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
Thailand EE 9 Cascavel
Europe
Portugal EE 9 Cascavel 
EE 11 Urutu
Embraer Latm America
Argentina 11 Xavante 1982
2 Bandeirante Patrulha B P 1982
30 Tucano 1986
Chile 3 Bandeirante 1986
6 B P 1977 79
Honduras 12 Tucano 1984 86
Panama 20 Tucano 1986
Paraguay 10 Xavante 1979
Bandeirante 1983
Peru 25 Tucano 1986
Venezuela
Africa
30 Tucano 1985
Angola 2 B P 1986
1 Bandeirante Carga 1986
Egypt 120 Tucano 1984
Gabon 3 Bandeirante 1980
1 B P 1980
Togo
Middle East
6 Xavante 1982
Iraq 80 Tucano
Europe
France 41 Xtngu 1982
Umted Kingdom 135 Tucano 1985
Avibras Middle East 
Iraq 38 Astros II SS 30 1985 86
Libya 15 Astros II SS-40 negotiating
Astros II 33-60 1987 negotiating
Saudi Arabia Astros II SS-40 1986 unconfirmed
Estimated Sale Cost EE 9 Cascavel and EE 11 Urutu US $500 000 800 000 EE T1 Osorio 
US $1 5 2 0 million Tucano US $1 3 1 5 m illion's tros II System US $10 million
Source Seguranca & Defesa No 3 Janeiro/Fevereiro 1985 pp 31 35 INFOSTRAT 1 ACE 
1986 Embraer 1985 SIPR1 Yearbook 1986 1987 E Jornal do Brasil 18 10/87 p 22
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Section IV The Catalytic Role of the Government
The Brazilian defense industry, unlike many in LDCs, is predominantly 
private 49 However, the State has played a very active role m the industry s 
development, production, organization, and industrial structure The State has 
developed and coordinated agencies that support and regulate the defense 
industry, including IMBEL, the Armed Forces Research Centers, the National 
Development Bank BNDEs, CACEX, and FINEP, a state funding agency for 
national development Proenca Filho mentions that the degree of interaction 
and coordination in the arms industry surpasses all other public/private 
partnerships undertaken by the government50
The Military R&D institutes have played a vital role m the industry s 
development The Air Force and Army have provided undergraduate and 
graduate programs for scientists and engineers since the 1940s, enabling the 
country to produce indigenous technology 51 Military institutes have also been 
technology suppliers to the private sector, and a majority of indigenous defense 
hardware systems has benefitted from technical assistance from one of the three 
military institutes for research and development the CTA, the Air Force s 
Centro Technologico da Aerospacial R&D Center, the CTEx, the Army's Centro 
Tecnologico de Exercito R&D Center, and the CPqM, the Navy s Centro Pesquisas 
da Maninha R&D Center
The Air Force s CTA was established in 1945 and today employs 
approximately 7,000 people Five institutes are subordinated to CTA see Figure 1 
the ITA (Instituto de Tecnologia da Aeronautica), which trams aerospace 
engineers and does basic research, the IPD (Instituto de Pesquisa e 
Desenvolvimento), a R&D institute, the IAE (Instituto de Atividades 
Aerospaaais), a space research institute, the IEAv, an advanced studies institute, 
and the IFI (Instituto de Fomentaçâo e Coordenaçâo), which promotes and 
coordinates the aerospace industry IAE is in charge of research and 
development of Air Force defense material, while IEAv does advanced studies m 
the laser and nuclear fields, and IFI acts as a bridge between the Air Force centers 
of R&D and the private aerospace industry ITA has had a strong impact on 
companies such as Embraer, and in fact, has trained the majority of the firm s 
engineers 52 CTA has also provided major stimulus for Air Force R&D efforts 
In 1988 CTA helped Orbita to develop the sophisticated Piranha MA-A1 air-to-air 
missile 53
The Armys R&D center, CTEx, was established in 1977 Figure 1 shows 
that CTEx is under the umbrella of the Army s Secretariat of Science and 
Technology The Secretariat is comprised of the IME Military Engineering 
School, the IPD Research and Development Institute, the INIT Institute of 
Norms and Informatics, and the Institute of Incentives to the Private Sector 
CTEx does not charge for the technology it transfers to the private sector One of 
its top projects is the development of a microchip that will be used to control and
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guide missiles The Army has followed the PGPDEX Army s General Plan for 
Research and Development, which is a guiding light of the Army s efforts m 
developing indigenous technology 54
Technological development in the Brazilian arms industry has not been 
evenly distributed across the branches of the Armed Forces The Army and the 
Air Force have more sophisticated technology than the Navy, partly due to 
historical circumstances Ferreira argues that since the Navy Insurgence m 
1903, the Brazilian government has down-played the role of the Navy and has 
purposely relegated the group to a secondary position 55 The Navy is fighting to 
change this by researching innovative defense projects such as the nuclear 
submarine The discrepancy between the three branches has other roots as well 
The Navy has been less willing to accept external input in its technological 
efforts than have the Air Force and the Army 56 In addition, the Navy has been 
hardest hit by the country s external debt crisis of the 1980s, largely due to the 
magnitude of naval projects
Following the BDI s general lead, the Navy Directorate of Naval 
Engineering DEN favors nationalization of defense hardware The Navy s 
technological motto states that investments in defense should, to the extent 
possible, represent a stimulus to the nation s economy, development, and 
growth DEN also has strict policies on foreign participation in Brazilian naval 
programs MNCs must increasingly use local content and secure local logistical 
support to supply parts domestically With technical assistance from the German 
firm IKL (Ingenieur Kantor Lubeck /Industrial), DEN has been developing two 
non-nuclear submarines, the NAC-1 and NAC-2 With the IPEN/USP 
(Umversidade de Säo Paulo), the Navy is developing a nuclear reactor for 
installation in Brazilian nuclear submarines The Navy has also transferred 
nuclear technology to the Argentine Navy for development of fast-breeder 
reactors 57
The finance and trade legs of the industry are mostly comprised of BNDEs, 
Banco do Brasil, FINEP, and CACEX The BNDEs extends credit to firms in the 
industry In 1987 Engesa borrowed US $165 million from two governmental 
agencies BNDEs and Banco do Brasil Banco do Brasil lent US $100 million to 
Engesa, while BNDEs provided Engesa with US $65 million at subsidized interest 
rates 58
FINEP is the Brazilian financing agency for research and scientific 
development It reports to the Ministry of Science and Technology and has 
financed more than 10,000 projects over the past twenty years At present, FINEP 
is funding sectors that can alleviate supply bottlenecks to the defense industry, 
such as microelectronics In the past, FINEP financed Embraer s EMB-312 
Tucano and Avibras Astros II Table 7 lists a sample of defense firms receiving 
financial support for R&D from FINEP Banco do Brasil, through its foreign
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trade agency CACEX, allocates trade credits to foreign buyers of Brazilian-made 
weaponry
Table 7 Defense Firms Financed by FINEP1987
Firm Project/Product Financed
Elebra Microeletromca Integrate project of pilot plant in microelectronics
Engesa Development of the EE T1 Osorio MBT
Labo Electrónica Development of products
Metal Leve Research center development of pilot plant in piston molds
Coester Transport system
Tecnasa Eletromca Development of new technology in radio navigation
Scopus Technologia Local network development
Elebra Telecomumcacoes Software integration laboratory
CBV Industria Mecamca Development of products
Cobra Computadores Operation system
Tecnasa Development of VDR/DME system for radio navigation
Acesita Training staff personnel at the graduate level
Ind Reumdas Caneco CAD/CAM system
Fupresa Hitchiner Import of a R&D center for high technology products
Source Compiled from FINEP Relatono Annual 1987 and Brazilian Defense Directory 1987
Section V The Tripod Structure of the Industry 
The Role of SOEs, Private Sector, and Multinationals
The structure of the BDI combines SOEs, private domestic enterprises, and MNC 
subsidiaries, and spans over 650 firms 59 Defense firms permeate virtually all 
sectors of the Brazilian economy but are largely concentrated in four states Säo 
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul
SOE Enterprises
State-owned enterprises are found in all three branches of the Brazilian 
Armed Forces SOEs as producers play a larger role in the aircraft industry 
Embraer, which is the largest SOE in the defense industry, originally specialized 
in the production of planes with low technological content However, in 1989 
Embraer was designing and manufacturing a whole family of advanced aircraft 
ranging from agricultural planes to jet fighters Embraer also builds a wide range 
of single and twin engine piston planes under an industrial cooperation 
agreement with the American firm Piper 60
Embraer s success is attributed to a number of joint ventures and licensing 
agreements throughout the 1970s that enabled the aircraft producer to acquire 
large scale assembling technology from the Italian firm Aermacchi, sales
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techniques from Piper, and inputs such as landing gears for its airplanes from the 
French company Eran 61
Embraer was the first producer from a NIC to develop a combat jet 
aircraft—the fighter/bomber and ground attack aircraft AMX The jet fighter has 
no real competitors m its category, and the plane is arriving in the market at a 
time when competitive products are becoming obsolete 62 In 1988 Embraer 
officials announced their plans to produce a supersonic light fighter, the MFT- 
LF63
Embraer exports to five continents, and m 1985 was ranked the six largest 
manufacturer of airplanes in the world 64 This SOE was able within a relatively 
short time to successfully compete in a worldwide industry that has high barriers 
to entry Embraer s success results from its flexibility m designing products that 
may be used for either military or civilian purposes With 556 sold, the Tucano 
EMB-312 a fighter trainer, is the worlds best-selling aircraft in its category, 
surpassing similar Swiss, British, and Australian aircraft65
Brazilian Private Sector
In contrast to other LDC defense industries, such as Argentina s,66 the 
private sector plays an important role in the Brazilian industry The BDI has 
offered the private sector opportunities for higher degrees of capacity utilization, 
a way to offset downswings in the domestic market, and potentially new markets 
m which it can sell products for the civilian market via dual-use technology For 
instance, Metal Leve, originally a supplier of engine pistons to Embraer, 
currently exports pistons to the US aircraft market
Avibras and Engesa are Brazil s private sector leaders in the defense 
industry Founded in 1961, Avibras developed a wide array of research in the 
aerospace field, an entire set of air-to-ground and surface-to-surface weapon 
systems, and a whole family of scientific rockets 67 In the early 1970s the 
technology and skills amassed m the development of civilian rockets were 
diverted to military endeavors 68 Through the years Avibras has vertically 
integrated its operations, creating subsidiaries in space research and in the 
electronic, chemical, spatial research, and communications sectors 69
Avibras line of products consists of space research systems, surface-to- 
surface defense systems, air-to-ground defense systems, electronics and 
communications, and satellite communication earth stations and radars In 
addition, its subsidiaries Tectran and Tectroms produce special transport systems 
and electric vehicles 70 One of the mam global competitive advantages of 
Avibras is its on-site assistance and training Like Engesa, the company also 
customizes its products according to customer specifications In the mid-1980s 
eighty percent of Avibras income came from international sales 71
19
Engesa—Engenheiros Especializados—is the second largest exporter of 
wheeled armored fighting vehicles in the world 72 Originally a producer of oil­
field pumps, the company developed a unique suspension for vehicles In 1968 
the Army noticed the 6-wheel drive vehicles Engesa was manufacturing and 
contracted with the firm to convert 100 army trucks Since then Engesa has 
developed a full line of armored vehicles 73
The company produces and exports a wide array of other products, 
including mam battle tanks, utility military vehicles, tank transporters, weapons 
systems, ammunition, communication systems, and electronic warfare 74 Engesa 
products are renowned for their ruggedness, low cost, ease of operation, and 
adaptability to developing countries' terrain and climates characterizing 
developing countries Engesa s most popular products, the EE-9 Cascave 1 and EE- 
11 Urutu, are currently exported to 35 countries Engesa concentrates its sales in 
LDCs, exploiting market segments neglected by major arms exporters by 
tropicalizing its technology Today Engesa has 17 plants with 12,000 employees 
and a diversified production capability 75 The company has vertically and 
horizontally integrated its activities Most of its hardware is exported through 
Engexco, its trading company, which exports items ranging from orange juice to 
tanks 76
As a protected firm, Engesa was the sole producer of wheeled armored 
vehicles, while Avibras monopolized the production of missiles In 1987 Engesa 
joined Embraer and IMBEL to form Orbita, a company geared toward producing 
an array of missiles 77
Subsidiaries of Multinational Companies
Brazilian subsidiaries of MNCs constitute another vital leg of the Brazilian 
defense industry s tripod Their role, which on the surface appears to be very 
restricted, is a vital one because they supply components and technology through 
sub-contractmg and licensing agreements MNCs also invest heavily in 
Brazilian companies
In 1987, 159 MNCs were involved in the BDI US subsidiaries constituted 
the largest group, followed by the Europeans and the Japanese There is 
specialization among the MNCs operating in the defense industry French and 
Italian subsidiaries are concentrated in aerospace activities while West German 
Japanese, Swedish, and US subsidiaries undertake a wide scope of activities The 
British are primarily involved in shipbuilding 78
In the majority of cases MNCs produce both civilian and military 
products This dual-use capability makes it difficult to delineate specific MNC 
supply functions 79 For instance, in the transport equipment industry MNCs
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supply components Engesa buys locally produced parts from GM, Perkins, 
Mercedes-Benz, and Saab-Scama Volkswagen and Toyota subsidiaries supply 
engines and parts to local manufacturers of military vehicles 80
Multinational subsidiaries are also involved m joint ventures m the BDI 
Embraer s AMX, a sophisticated combat airplane, is being developed with two 
Italian firms, Aentalia and Aermacchi, 48 percent of the work goes to Aeritalia, 
30 percent to Embraer, and 22 percent to Aermacchi81 In early 1987 Embraer 
started negotiations with McDonnell-Douglas to produce a commercial jet plane 
that will compete directly with Airbus and Boeing aircraft
MNCs are also active investors m Brazilian defense companies For 
instance, Volkswagen is the largest single private investor in Embraer,82 Phillips 
has a joint production with Engesa m the company s branch Engetronica 30 
percent, and Aerospatiale from France has a stake in the Brazilian helicopter 
firm Helibras 83
;
Future European MNC participation is likely to increase because, unlike 
their American counterparts, European MNCs do not seek much control over 
end users 84 Future involvement by American MNCs in the Brazilian industry 
will continue to be restricted by embargoes that prevent sales to one of Brazil s 
best markets— Libya
Section VI Future Developments
In 1987 the Brazilian defense industry entered a new phase The BDI s 
highly specialized market-niche strategies were the impetus for change
First, Brazil initiated a new industrial strategy that forces final producers to 
become more competitive by reducing protection The recently established 
Orbita is a good example of increasing competitiveness in the industry For the 
first time final producers within Brazil, such as Orbita and Avibras, are directly 
competing in the same range of products—missiles, for example
Second, MNCs are becoming more involved than previously, deepening 
the international linkages of the industry The BDI is moving towards a closer 
cooperation with European countries in order to technologically upgrade its 
defense hardware This has been the first sign of exhaustion of the ' dual-use 
technology approach In 1987 the Groupement des Industries Françaises 
Aeronautiques et Spatiales GIF AS, representing 36 supplier firms, promoted the 
first ever aerospace event in Brazil85
Third, the growth strategy based on readily available parts and technology 
is evolving to a more sophisticated and more elaborate weaponry, which will 
gradually avoid the dual-use technology approach and thereby reduce the spill-
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over effects in the economy Also indicative of technological deepening are the 
Navy s project for a nuclear submarine, Engesa s Osorio, along with A vibras SS- 
300 and CTA SS-1000 ballistic missiles 86
Fourth, the Brazilian government has decided to increase the Armed 
Forces budget, a measure that has important implications for the development of 
indigenous technology by the military These trends are related to the Armed 
Forces modernization plan for the 1990s, which was initiated during the second 
half of the 1980s Referred to as the FT-90, the plan calls for a number of 
investments in key technological areas The goals of the FT-90 are twofold 
modernization and professionalization of the Brazilian Armed Forces The plan 
also intends to take advantage of Brazil s indigenous arms industry, which has 
already resulted in increased R&D expenditures in nuclear technology 87 In the 
1980s Brazil took serious steps toward further utilization of the atom for defense 
There are indications that the Navy is running a parallel nuclear program, and it 
is well known that the Navy has plans to initiate its project for a nuclear 
submarine in the 1990s 88
The Air Force, through Avibras, is also developing a new family of 
missiles— in particular, the SS-300 missile, cosponsored by the Army General 
Plan for R&D—capable of reaching ranges beyond 300 kilometers The CTA has 
already started research to build the SS-1000, a medium-range ballistic missile 
capable of carrying a one-ton payload to distances up to 1,200 kilometers and 
capable of spanning the whole Latin American continent89
Further involvement and interactions of the BDI with the Brazilian 
computer industry are also expected As was mentioned earlier, military projects 
were the driving force behind the creation of the computer industry 90 It is 
believed in Brazil that a strong and relatively self-sufficient computer industry is 
a sine qua non for the future of the BDI Already, there are several informatics 
firms doing military related research Scopus, Cobra, etc The major firms in the 
defense industry— Engesa, Bernardini and Avibras—have their own research 
laboratories pursuing the development of indigenous software Bernardini, for 
instance, recently inaugurated two computer-related units to further develop 
hardware and software These endeavors have already achieved some degree of 
success For instance, the integration software for Avibras Astros II is being 
made in Brazil91
However, Brazil lacks substantial research in inertial navigation systems, 
which is fundamental to the further development and upgrade of missiles and 
solid microelectronics technology 92 Brazil also lacks the technology to integrate 
the electronic systems of a supersonic jet fighter
The future development of the BDI also faces external restrictions In the 
1980s the defense industry had to contend with a number of technological 
barriers to expansion, including export restrictions by DCs on sophisticated
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computers and military technology For instance, the US has restricted 
supercomputer sales to Brazil and has pressured Japan and West Germany to 
adopt similar strategies In April 1988, Canada, England, France, Italy, Japan, the 
US, and West Germany signed an agreement imposing embargoes on military 
rocket technology to NICs, including Brazil93 These practices impose serious 
constraints on the Brazilian space program
Conclusion
The rapid development of the Brazilian arms industry was the result of political 
and economic motivations The catalytic roles of the government and SOEs 
were vital for the establishment of the industry and for the promotion of 
indigenous technology development In addition, the tripod strategy was vital 
for the maturity and viability of the industry The strategy of using dual-use 
technology reduced costs substantially and offered a competitive advantage 
internationally Finally, the simultaneous import substitution and export 
promotion strategies provided the needed exposure and financial support for 
further investments
This paper has also presented evidence showing that, in many instances, 
the private sector has benefited from the externalities provided by SOEs, 
indicating that the State and private domestic enterprises can enhance each 
other s performance and competitiveness in the international trade scene
Future development of the industry is likely to be conditioned by three 
factors First, it will be vital to the industry s technological upgrading that the 
country have access to more sophisticated technologies However, barriers from 
developed countries have limited Brazil s access to computer technology related 
to defense hardware development and to missile technologies Second, conflicts 
between the arms industry export policy and Brazil s diplomatic policy are likely 
to increase in the future, possible forcing Brazil to restrict exports 94 Third, the 
high dependency on exports severely affected the industry in 1989 The lack of 
demand from Arab countries, specifically from Iraq, has had a negative impact 
on Brazilian defense hardware exports Avibras alone saw a 50 percent decline in 
its exports 95 This has resulted in massive unemployment in the industry 
Avibras cut one-third of its labor force, and Engesa dismissed 1,200 people in 
1989 Orbita has also reduced its labor force by half 96
Despite these setbacks, the Brazilian defense industry is likely to continue 
growing domestically and externally Recent efforts such as the development of 
the AMX will provide a more attractive package of arms for Brazilian 
customers in the future
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